🔍 What If Consciousness Is Not Primary?

A Foundational Page of Similarity Theory
By Simon Raphael

Similarity Theory begins with a foundational claim: consciousness is ontologically primary — that is, consciousness is not produced by reality but is itself the living basis of reality.

(See Consciousness page for the formal definition: in Similarity Theory, consciousness is ontological life — active, informational, knowledge-bearing — not merely biological awareness.)

But any serious framework must be able to withstand internal stress. So we ask:

What if consciousness is not primary?

Would the structure collapse?

🧱 The Load-Bearing Premise

In its current form, the architecture of Similarity Theory unfolds as follows:

Consciousness exists.
Consciousness differentiates.
Differentiation generates Frames of Time.
Preserved Frames create measurable progression (what we call time).
Dimensions are rule-sets of awareness.

If premise (1) fails, the sequence must be re-examined.

However, the collapse is not immediate. What changes is not necessarily the structure — but the grounding layer.

⚖️ Alternative Axiom: “Relational Structure Is Primary”

Suppose we begin instead with:

Relational structure is fundamental.

Under this view, reality begins not with awareness but with interaction — difference, relation, structure.

Two entities interact.
A state changes.
A relation is formed.

From this perspective:

Frames of Time become preserved relational states.
Dimensions become increasing rule-complexity.
Branching becomes informational divergence.
Time becomes the measurement of structural change.

The architecture still functions.

What disappears is the metaphysical declaration that consciousness came first.

🌉 The Origin of Relation

Here the deeper problem emerges. If relational structure is primary, one must ask: How does relation arise?

Relation requires:

Difference.
Distinguishability.
Structured interaction.

But distinguishability implies informational separation. And information implies structured distinction. At this threshold, the debate sharpens:

Is relation purely mechanical interaction?
Or is interaction already a minimal form of proto-awareness?

If the former, then consciousness is emergent.
If the latter, then consciousness was present — though perhaps in minimal form — from the beginning.

Similarity Theory leans toward the second interpretation: that relation is not independent of consciousness, but an early expression of it.

🧠 What Is Meant by “Consciousness”?

Much confusion arises because “consciousness” is often equated with subjective human experience.

Similarity Theory does not require that. It defines consciousness minimally as:

Ontological life.
Informational differentiation.
The capacity to generate and preserve structured states.

Under this definition, even the most basic relational interaction may qualify as proto-conscious activity. Thus, removing “consciousness” as primary does not eliminate the underlying mechanics — it simply renames the foundation.

📎 Structural Integrity Test

If consciousness were not primary in the subjective sense, the framework would still describe:

Persistent informational states.
Branching structural development.
Dimensional layering as rule-sets.
Non-erasure of relational history (Frames of Time).

What would shift is the interpretation of origin — not the coherence of progression.

Therefore, Similarity Theory does not collapse if its first premise is challenged. Instead, it clarifies its dependency: It is a structurally coherent model that becomes metaphysically explicit only when consciousness is treated as ontological life.

🔄 Why This Matters

A theory that cannot examine its own foundation is fragile.

A theory that can articulate:

its load-bearing axioms,
its alternative groundings,
and the consequences of each,

demonstrates architectural maturity. This page is not a retreat from the claim that consciousness is primary. It is a demonstration that the framework understands what would change — and what would not — if that claim were contested.

References

Standard materialist accounts of emergence and relational ontology.
Panpsychist and information-theoretic interpretations of reality.
Structural realism in philosophy of science.